Empire Land Title, Inc., aka Empire Title Company: Appellant\u27s Reply to Respondent\u27s Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Empire Land Title, Inc., aka Empire Title
Company: Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald J. Winder, Lincoln W. Hobbs; Winder & Haslam; attorneys for appellant.
Mark F. Robinson, Claude E. Zobell, Jr.; Robinson, Seiler & Glazier; attorneys for respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation









IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EMPIRE LAND TITLE, INC., 
aka EMPIRE TITLE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WEYERHAEUSER MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 890171-CA 
Priority: 14(b) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE E. PATRICK McGUIRE 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Mark F. Robinson, Esq. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
80 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
MAY 2 41889 
Utah Court ct *j:-;;-eal8 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EMPIRE LAND TITLE, INC., 
aka EMPIRE TITLE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WEYERHAEUSER MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 890171-CA 
Priority: 14(b) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE E. PATRICK McGUIRE 
Mark F. Robinson, Esq. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
80 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Esq. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I EMPIRE IS LIMITED TO THE RIGHTS OF 
ITS ASSIGNOR, WILSON, AND IS SUB-
JECT TO WEYERHAEUSER'S DEFENSES. 12 
POINT II EMPIRE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 12 
POINT III ASSUMING THERE WAS AN INSTRUMENT 
IN WRITING JUSTIFYING A SIX-YEAR 
LIMITATION, EMPIRE IS OTHERWISE 
PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING ITS ACTION. 15 
POINT IV EMPIRE WAS REQUIRED, AS A PREREQUI-
SITE TO ITS CLAIM, TO OFFER TO WEYER-
HAEUSER THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE, OR 
PAST DUE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS ON THE 
PREMISES INVOLVED. 16 
POINT V EMPIRE FAILED TO JOIN THE REAL 
PARTIES IN INTEREST IN THIS ACTION, 
AND OTHER PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST 
ADJUDICATION. 17 
i 
POINT VI EMPIRE FAILED TO PROVE ITS DAMAGES 
IN THE COURT BELOW WITH THE SPECI-
FICITY REQUIRED. 19 
POINT VII THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES "EXPENDED IN COLLECTING" THE 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) Petition for Cert. Filed 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(March 17, 1989) (890091) 
Bastion v. King. 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983) 
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co. . 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 
(1938) 
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 
1370 (Utah 1987) 
Bunnell v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) 
Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms. 28 Utah 2d 125, 499 P.2d 273 
(1972) 
Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984) 
McCarren v. Merrill. 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964) 
O'Brien v. King. 174 Cal. 769, 164 P. 631 (1917) 
Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 271, 508 
P.2d 536 (1973) 
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(Utah 1976) 
Valcarce v. Bitters. 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961) 
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Co.. 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980) 
Winsness v. M. J. Conoco Distributors. 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 
1979) 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-23 (1987) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1988) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26 (1987) 
iii 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 17 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Restatement of Contracts Section 349(1) 
iv 
JURISDICTION 
Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, confer jurisdiction upon this Court 
to hear this appeal. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is taken from the final judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit Court of Utah County, Provo Department, entered 
by the Honorable E. Patrick McGuire (the "Judgment"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Are Empire Land Title, Inc.'s ("Empire") claims, which 
were brought pursuant to an assignment from Kelly Wilson ("Wil-
son") , barred by Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company's ("Weyerhaeuser") 
affirmative defenses which were available against Wilson? 
2. Were Empire's claims barred by Utah Code Ann. Sections 
78-12-25 and 26 because the Complaint was filed in excess of 
four (4) years following the payment of money to Weyerhaeuser? 
3. Alternatively, if the circuit court's ruling applying 
a 6-year statute of limitations is upheld, did Empire's assignor 
breach its obligations under the writing (the Beneficiary State-
ment) , thus excusing the need for Weyerhaeuser's performance? 
4. Did Empire's failure to join Shand Morahan & Company 
and P. Scott Construction Company result in the absence of real 
parties in interest and/or indispensable parties under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus precluding the relief awarded to 
Empire? 
5. Was Empire's claim against Weyerhaeuser subject to an 
offset for the amounts Wilson should have paid Weyerhaeuser 
under the Beneficiary Statement or for the fair rental value of 
the property? 
6. Did Empire fail to establish its damages, if any, with 
the necessary specificity? 
7. Did the circuit court err in providing an award of 
attorneys1 fees expended in collecting the judgment? 
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES 
The following authorities are dispositive of the issues 
herein: 
a. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-23 (1987) provides: 
78-12-23. Within six years - Mesne profits 
of real property - Instrument 
in writing - Distribution of 
criminal proceeds to victim. 
Within six years. 
(1) An action for the mesne profits of real 
property. 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, 
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
(3) An action instituted under Section 78-
11-12.5 regarding distribution of criminal proceeds 
to any victim. 
b. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1988) provides: 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation 
or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; 
also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchan-
dise, and for any article charged on a store account; 
also on an open account for work, labor or services 
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rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that ac-
tion in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced 
at any time within four years after the last charge 
is made or the last payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action 
under the following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25, 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a), which in 
specific situations limits the time for action to one 
year, under Section 26-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise pro-
vided for by law. 
c. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26 (1987) provides: 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or 
injury to real property; except that when waste or 
trespass is committed by means of underground works 
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not 
accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of 
the facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or in-
juring personal property, including actions for spe-
cific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually 
included in the term 'livestock1, which at the time 
of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if the ani-
mal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without 
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the 
owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put 
a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of 
the animal by the defendant. 
(3) an action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in 
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake. 
(4) an action for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed 
by the statutes of this state. 
(5) an action to enforce liability imposed 
by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action does 
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not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reason-
ably should know of the harm suffered. 
d. Utah R. Civ. P. 17 provides: 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall 
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in inter-
est. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in 
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of 
another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in 
his own name without joining with him the party for 
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a stat-
ute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of 
another shall be brought in the name of the state of 
Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground 
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest until a reasonable time has been 
allowed after objection for ratification of commence-
ment of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest; and such ratification, 
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect 
as if the action had been commenced in the name of 
the real party in interest. 
e. Utah R. Civ. P. 19 provides: 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudica-
tion. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person 
who is subject to service of process and whose joinder 
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or 
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in his absence may (i) as a practical mat-
ter impair or impede his ability to protect that in-
terest or (ii) leave any of the persons already par-
ties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by 
reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been 
so joined, the court shall order that he be made a 
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses 
to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper 
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case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party 
objects to venue and his joinder would render the 
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed 
from the action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Weyerhaeuser requests that this Court reverse the circuit 
court's judgment below on any or all of the grounds argued, and 
that this Court remand this case to that court for dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In late summer of 1982, Wilson agreed to purchase a parcel 
of property in American Fork, Utah. At that time, Wilson, Empire 
and Weyerhaeuser•s loan assumption department believed the prop-
erty was owned by P. Scott Construction Company and that there 
was a serious default respecting an underlying mortgage on the 
property with Weyerhaeuser. Empire agreed to conduct the clos-
ing on the sale, and caused a title search to be conducted on the 
property. Also, Empire requested from Weyerhaeuser's assumption 
department, information respecting the amounts necessary for 
Wilson to assume the loan then believed to be existing. Weyer-
haeuser provided a Beneficiary Statement which reflected that a 
closing on the property must occur before September 15, 1982, 
and that the assumption charges on the mortgage would be 
$5,473.04. The Beneficiary Statement also provided "loan pay-
ments must be brought and kept current during the escrow as loan 
activity will continue.", that payments on the property were 
$213.00"per month and that the payments would be due on the 
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first of every month thereafter. It was Empire's custom and 
habit to explain the significance of these obligations of pay-
ments to purchasers of property assuming mortgages, and there is 
no evidence the custom and habit was not followed in this in-
stance. The amount of $5,473.04 was transmitted by Empire to 
Weyerhaeuser, although it was not established at trial who 
originally paid the money. 
After receiving apparent title to the property, Wilson 
allowed Bart Papworth ("Papworth") to reside on the subject 
premises from September 1982 through May 1985. The fair rental 
value for the premises during this period of time was $3 50.00 
per month, for a total fair rental value of $11,200.00 for the 
3 2 months involved. No one made any payments to Weyerhaeuser 
during this period of time. 
Wilson later discovered that, unbeknownst to both Empire 
and Weyerhaeuser's assumption department, the property he had 
attempted to assume had, in fact, been foreclosed prior to Sep-
tember 1982. Wilson and his parents, Max and Sue Wilson, demanded 
that Empire reimburse them for their losses as a result of the 
transaction. After some negotiations, Empire and its errors 
and omissions carrier made a cash payment to Wilson, Max Wilson 
and Sue Wilson in settlement of their claim. As part of the 
settlement agreement, Wilson assigned his claims against Weyer-
haeuser to Empire and to Shand Morahan & Company, Empire's errors 
and omissions insurance carrier. Wilson's parents did not make 
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any assignment to Empire. Empire thereafter made demand upon 
Weyerhaeuser for repayment of the money paid to Weyerhaeuser 
after the closing. Weyerhaeuser refused to pay the money to 
Empire without receiving the fair rental value or mortgage pay-
ments in return. Empire commenced this action on March 23, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The circuit court's record consists of two separate tran-
scripts. In this Statement of Facts, reference will be made to 
the Transcript of Trial, or to the Transcript of Cross Examina-
tion of Thomas Hare ("Cross Examination Transcript"). 
a. On August 26, 1982, at Empire's request, Weyerhaeuser 
delivered a written Beneficiary Statement to Empire setting 
forth that there was a $5,473.04 deficiency on a mortgage be-
tween Weyerhaeuser and P. Scott Construction Company which Wil-
son desired to assume (plaintiff's Exhibit 1; Transcript of 
Trial, p. 14). 
b. The Beneficiary Statement reflected that "P. Scott 
Constr. Co." was the mortgagor, that the monthly payments under 
the mortgage would be $213.00, and further provided that "Loan 
payments must be brought and kept current during this escrow 
as loan activity will continue." It was Empire's custom and 
habit at all closings to explain to purchasers assuming loans 
that the purchasers would be required to make monthly payments 
on assumed loans (plaintiff's Exhibit 1; Cross Examination Tran-
script, p. 9) . 
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c. At some time between their original contact with Wilson 
and the closing on September 13, 1982, Empire conducted a title 
search on the property. Empire failed to discover in their 
search, however, that the property had been sold at a trustee's 
sale on March 26, 1982, and that a trustee's deed had been re-
corded in April of 1982 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 16-19 and 21; 
Cross Examination Transcript, p. 10; plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
d. At the time of closing on the attempted assumption on 
September 13, 1982, the mortgage to be assumed had been previ-
ously foreclosed, unbeknownst to Weyerhaeuser's assumption de-
partment and to Empire (plaintiff's Exhibit 3; Transcript of 
Trial, pp. 20-24). 
e. On September 13, 1982, Empire provided Weyerhaeuser 
with a check for $5,473.04. The voucher portion of the check, 
also provided to Weyerhaeuser, made reference to P. Scott Con-
struction Company and to the loan, but not to Wilson (plain-
tiff's Exhibit 2; defendant's Exhibit 7; Cross Examination Tran-
script, p. 18). 
f. It was not established at trial whether the money paid 
to Weyerhaeuser originally came from Wilson or another (Cross 
Examination Transcript, pp. 14 and 16). 
g. Subsequent to the closing, Papworth retained the use 
and possession of the subject property. Papworth remained in 
possession from September 6, 1982 until May 6, 1985 (Transcript 
of Trial, pp. 29-30, 38 and 73). 
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h. The fair rental value of the property between Septem-
ber 1982 and May 1985 was stipulated by the parties to have 
been $350.00 per month (Transcript of Trial, p. 43). 
i. From September 1982 through May 1985 neither Wilson, 
Empire nor Papworth made any mortgage or rental payments to 
Weyerhaeuser (defendant's Exhibit 14; Transcript of Trial, pp. 
69-70 and 74; Cross Examination Transcript, p. 23). 
j. At some time following the closing, it was discovered 
that Weyerhaeuserfs foreclosure department had previously fore-
closed the mortgage intended to be assumed. On April 12, 1984, 
Empire demanded repayment of $5,473.04 from Weyerhaeuser (plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4; Transcript of Trial, pp. 23-28; defendant's 
Exhibit 14). 
k. On April 16, 1985, Empire and its errors and omissions 
insurance carrier settled with Empire's clients, Wilson, Max 
Wilson and Sue Wilson (plaintiff's Exhibit 5; Transcript of Trial, 
pp. 24-25; Cross Examination Transcript, pp. 5-6). 
1. Approximately one-third (1/3) of the settlement money 
paid to the Wilsons was, in fact, paid by Shand Morahan & Com-
pany, Empire's errors and omissions insurance carrier. Empire 
did not establish, at trial, the amount it actually paid in the 
settlement (Cross Examination Transcript, pp. 5-6). 
m. Empire's alleged rights to pursue the action arose 
from a Release and Assignment of Claims dated April 16, 1985, 
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which assigned only Kelly Wilson's claims (Cross Examination 
Transcript, pp. 14-16; plaintiff's Exhibit 5). 
n. Wilson's tenant, Papworth, did not vacate the subject 
property and return it to Weyerhaeuser until May 1985, following 
a request from Weyerhaeuser (Transcript of Trial, pp. 73 and 76) . 
o. Empire's action herein was commenced on March 23, 1987, 
alleging three theories of recovery: (i) breach of agreement; 
(ii) unjust enrichment; and (iii) mistake (Complaint, R. 1-3) . 
p. At trial, counsel for Empire acknowledged he was not 
pursuing attorneys' fees, that there was no contractual basis 
for an award of attorneys' fees, and that Weyerhaeuser' s de-
fenses were valid and did not justify any statutory award of 
attorneys' fees (Transcript of Trial, p. 99). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Weyerhaeuser appeals the circuit court's judgment in favor 
of Empire. In reviewing the facts of this case, it must be 
recalled from the outset that Empire brought its claim pursuant 
to an assignment from Wilson, and no one else. Thus, Empire is 
limited to those claims Wilson himself could have asserted, and 
is subject to the defenses which could have been asserted against 
Wilson and were asserted against Empire. 
Additionally, Empire failed to pursue its action for four 
and one-half years after the mistake, precluding its relief by 
virtue of the applicable statutes of limitation. Further, the 
evidence at trial failed to establish that Wilson himself had 
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paid the original $5,473.04 which was the subject of the dispute. 
The evidence did establish, however, that Empire's errors and 
omissions insurance carrier, Shand Morahan & Company, paid ap-
proximately one-third of the settlement amount actually paid to 
Wilson and his parents. Empire, however, did not join Shand 
Morahan & Company, clearly a real party in interest, as plain-
tiff. Empire also failed to join the sellers or tenant of the 
property who were indispensable to afford relief. 
The only possible basis for the ruling of the court below 
would be based upon the court's desire for restitution damages 
arising from mistake. However, in assessing damages for mistake, 
both parties must be placed in the position they had been in 
prior to the mistake. A prerequisite to this is that Empire 
tender any benefits they (or their assignor) receive. In this 
case, it was established that Wilson's tenant, Papworth, occu-
pied the premises from September 1982 through May 1985. If 
Empire is awarded damages under either its unjust enrichment or 
mistake theory, it must first tender to Weyerhaeuser the fair 
rental value of the property from September 1982 through May 
1985 ($11,200.00) or the mortgage payments Wilson did not make 
($6,816.00, excluding late fees and additional interest). Wil-
son's failure to make these payments also excused Weyerhaeuser 
from performing. Finally, the court's award of attorneys' fees 
in its judgment is in contravention of the claims of the parties 




EMPIRE IS LIMITED TO THE RIGHTS 
OF ITS ASSIGNOR, WILSON, AND IS 
SUBJECT TO WEYERHAEUSER1S DEFENSES. 
Empire brought its claim through an assignment from Wilson, 
It is "[f]undamental to the law of assignments that an assignee 
take nothing more by his assignment than his assignor had." 
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980). As 
such, Empire was and is subject to any defenses which Weyer-
haeuser could assert against Wilson if this action had been 
brought by Wilson in his own name. It is thus apparent that 
the statute of limitations, Wilson's breach respecting his re-
quired performance, and Wilson's failure or refusal to return 
the benefits he received as a result of the parties' mistake, 
bar any relief to Empire. All of these affirmative defenses 
are set forth more fully below. 
POINT II 
EMPIRE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1988) provides that 
actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities not founded 
upon instruments of writing must be commenced within four (4) 
years. Alternatively, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26 (1987) 
provides that actions for relief upon the ground of mistake 
must be brought within three (3) years. The transaction giving 
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rise to this lawsuit occurred on September 13, 1982, at the 
closing of the real estate transaction. Empire failed to take 
any action respecting the mistake until March 23, 1987, four 
and one-half years after the closing. Clearly, all of Empire's 
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 
and the circuit court erred in allowing Empire to prevail on 
these theories. 
The only possible ground upon which Empire's claims were 
not barred by the applicable statute of limitations would be if 
the Beneficiary Statement (Exhibit PI) or the check from Empire 
to Weyerhaeuser (Exhibit P2) could be found to be the origin of 
Empire's claims, thus invoking the 6-year statute of limitations 
found in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-23 for "an action upon 
any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing..." The Beneficiary Statement and the check, however, 
lacked the specificity necessary to form a contract. Valcarce 
v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 63, 362 P.2d 427 (1961) ("A condition 
precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, 
either expressly or impliedly with sufficeint definiteness to 
be enforced.") quoted and reaffirmed in Pinaree v. Continental 
Group of Utah, Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). Further, 
Wilson was not even identified on the Beneficiary Statement or 
the check. The action arose not from any writing between the 
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parties, but rather as a result of mistakes made by Empire, 
Wilson and Weyerhaeuser. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the 
six year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
12-23 only applies "when the contract, obligation or liability 
grows out of written instruments, not remotely or ultimately, 
but immediately." (emphasis in original). Bracklein v. Realty 
Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938), quoting O'Brien 
v. King. 174 Cal. 769, 164 P. 631, 632 (Cal. 1917). In Bracklein, 
the court found an action to enforce an assumption of a mortgage 
to be founded in the language of the deed requiring that the 
conveyance be subject to an assumption. Thus the obligation to 
pay money in Bracklein arose directly from the written instru-
ment. Bracklein has been followed repeatedly, including in the 
cases of Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 28 Utah 2d 125, 499 P.2d 
273 (1972) (Action under a written contract); and Brigham Young 
University v. Paulsen Constr. Co. . 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987) 
(the test for determining the applicability of the 6-year stat-
ute of limitations is "[I]f the fact of liability arises or is 
assumed or imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals, 
the liability is founded upon an instrument in writing") (quoting 
Bracklein, 95 Utah 490, 500, 80 P.2d 471, 476). Here, any ob-
ligation of Weyerhaeuser to repay money could not arise under 
any writing since there is no writing requiring any repayment in 
the event of a mistake. 
14 
POINT III 
ASSUMING THERE WAS AN INSTRUMENT IN WRITING 
JUSTIFYING A SIX-YEAR LIMITATION, EMPIRE IS 
OTHERWISE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING ITS ACTION. 
Assuming, arguendo, the Beneficiary Statement constitutes 
an instrument in writing extending the statute of limitations to 
six years, Empire is precluded from receiving any damages by 
virtue of Wilson's breach of the terms of that writing. McCarren 
v. Merrill, 15 Utah 2d 179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964) (Homeowner's 
failure to pay plumber, resulting in plumber's ceasing to work 
on job, precluded the homeowner's claim for damages resulting 
from work stoppage.); Petersen v. Intermountain Capital Corp., 
29 Utah 2d 271, 508 P.2d 536 (1973) (Demonstration of an intent 
by one party to not perform the contract relieves other party 
of requirement of performance.). The Beneficiary Statement pro-
vided, in clear and unequivocal terms, that "loan payments must 
be brought and kept current during this escrow as loan activity 
will continue." The Beneficiary Statement further recited that 
payments of $213.00 were payable on or before the first of every 
month. It was Empire's custom and practice to point this obli-
gation out to their clients. Despite this obligation, testimony 
at trial revealed that neither Wilson, nor anyone acting on his 
behalf, ever made any payments to Weyerhaeuser from the period 
of time between September 1982 and May 1985, despite an obli-
gation to do so. Clearly, this long-standing failure to make 
payments as provided under the contract would have excused Wey-
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erhaeuser from its ultimate performance of delivering title of 
the property to Wilson. Wilson's failure to comply with the 
terms of the alleged contract, evidencing the breach, justi-
fied Weyerhaeuser's refusal to perform. 
POINT IV 
EMPIRE WAS REQUIRED, AS A PREREQUISITE 
TO ITS CLAIM, TO OFFER TO WEYERHAEUSER 
THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE, OR PAST DUE MORTGAGE 
PAYMENTS ON THE PREMISES INVOLVED. 
The Restatement of Contracts provides: 
Section 349. Necessity of Returning the Consid-
eration Received by Plaintiff. 
(1) If the plaintiff has received any interest 
in land or goods or any other property in exchange 
for his own performance, he cannot get judgment for 
restitution in money unless promptly after knowledge 
of the breach he returns or offers to return what he 
has received, in substantially as good a condition as 
when it was transferred to him, except as stated in 
Subsection (2). 
Illustration 1 of subsection 1 of the Restatement states: 
1. A contracts to sell land to B, who is at 
once put in possession of the land, and makes an advance 
payment of $1,000. A later tenders a conveyance that 
is insufficient because of substantial defects in his 
title, and B rightly refuses to accept it. B can get 
judgment against A for the restitution of the* $1,000 
payment, diminished by the value of the use and occu-
pation of the land, if he promptly surrenders posses-
sion of the land after knowledge of A's breach. 
Contrary to Restatement of Contracts Section 349, however, 
Empire seeks a return of the $5,473.04, paid by mistake to Wey-
erhaeuser, without offering any compensation for Wilson's pos-
session of the property; and without paying any mortgage pay 
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ments or rental thereon from September 1982 to May 1985. Nei-
ther Empire, Wilson nor Papworth has ever offered to compensate 
Weyerhaeuser for the fair rental value of the property or for 
the mortgage payments never made. As a consequence, Empire's 
claim must be reduced by the offset to which Weyerhaeuser is 
entitled which, under the stipulated fair rental value of $350.00 
a month at trial, would be $11,200.00. The mortgage payments 
never made, excluding late fees and additional interest, were 
$6,816.00. 
Comment C to Restatement of Contracts Section 349 further 
requires a prompt return of the property as a prerequisite to 
restitution. It provides: "after [knowledge of breach] is 
acquired, the retention and continued use of land, or the re-
tention and continued use or consumption of goods, make resti-
tution unavailable as a remedy for the breach then known to 
exist." Wilson and Papworth did not return the property to 
Weyerhaeuser until after May 1985, when Weyerhaeuser requested 
Papworth to leave. 
POINT V 
EMPIRE FAILED TO JOIN THE REAL PARTIES 
IN INTEREST IN THIS ACTION, AND OTHER 
PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 17 and 19 set forth requirements for parties 
in civil actions, generally requiring that the real parties in 
interest, and those parties necessary for a just adjudication 
of the controversy be brought before the court. These Rules 
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"both seek to protect the same interests: judicial economy and 
fairness to the parties in litigation." Kemp v. Murray, 680 
P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). Rule 19 is to "guard against the 
entry of judgment which might prejudice the rights of [indispen-
sable parties] in their absence", and the Rule further "protects 
the interests of parties who are present by precluding multiple 
litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject matter 
as the original litigation. Rule 17(a) serves essentially the 
same policy by requiring an action to be brought by the real 
party in interest." Id. 
At the trial in this matter, Empire was unable to estab-
lish that Wilson had actually paid the original $5,473.04 which 
went to Weyerhaeuser. Empire thus has failed to prove that it 
in fact holds an assignment from the party entitled to recovery 
from Weyerhaeuser, if any party is entitled to such recovery. 
Further, Empire did not pay all of the amount returned to Wilson 
upon discovery of the mistake. Rather, Shand Morahan & Company, 
Empire's errors and omissions carrier, paid approximately one-
third of the settlement amount. Thus, Empire failed to establish 
its entitlement to recovery of the entire $5,473.04. Without an 
assignment, Empire clearly cannot pursue those monies paid by 
Shand Morahan & Company. 
Additionally, Empire failed to join certain persons who 
may have been needed for just adjudication. Rule 19(a) requires 
joinder of those parties if: 
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(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an in-
terest relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that the disposition of the action in his 
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a sub-
stantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. 
In this case, the original seller of the property, P. Scott 
Construction Company, was not made a party to the action, nor 
was Papworth, the tenant in the property from September 1982 
through May 1985. P. Scott Construction Company was an indis-
pensable party by virtue of its misrepresentation or concealment 
of the actual foreclosed status of the property and Papworth 
should have been brought forth as an indispensable party to the 
unjust enrichment claim since he, if anyone, was unjustly en-
riched. 
POINT VI 
EMPIRE FAILED TO PROVE ITS DAMAGES IN THE 
COURT BELOW WITH THE SPECIFICITY REQUIRED. 
In Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962), 
the Utah Supreme Court has clearly precluded courts from awarding 
damages based upon speculative and conjectural evidence. The 
principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See, e.g., Winsness 
v. M. J. Conoco Distributors, 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979) (affirm-
ing that damages based upon "mere speculation" cannot be upheld), 
Bastion v. King, 661 P. 2d 953 (Utah 1983) (findings of fact 
must provide a basis for determining whether there is a rational 
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basis for the award of damages). In this case, as is set forth 
in Point V above, Empire was unable to establish at trial: (1) 
that Wilson actually paid any money to Weyerhaeuser Mortgage 
Company; and (2) that Empire Land Title paid all of the money 
for which it seeks reimbursement, in settlement of this matter. 
Empire should not have been awarded judgment in light of its 
inability to meet its burden of establishing its damages. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES "EXPENDED 
IN COLLECTING" THE JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS. 
Generally, attorneys' fees are only awarded where there 
is a statutory or contractual basis for an award. Arnica Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) Petition 
for Cert, filed 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 17, 1989) (890091); 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). In this 
case, counsel for Empire conceded at trial there was no contrac-
tual or statutory basis for an award of attorneys' fees, however, 
the circuit court's judgment entered in this matter provided 
"this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable 
costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment 
by execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit." 
No contractual or statutory basis for an award of attorneys' 
fees was ever asserted at trial, the circuit court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained no reference to such a 
basis for an award of attorneys' fees, and there is, in fact, 
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no basis for an award of such attorneys' fees. Therefore, the 
circuit court's judgment award of attorneys' fees in collecting 
the judgment is in error, and the same should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below erred in failing to recognize and consider 
any of the issues addressed above. 
Empire, in pursuing it claims, is limited to the claims 
of its assignor, Wilson. As such, its claims were barred by 
virtue of the statutes of limitation and the lapse of more than 
four years from the closing of the transaction. 
Furthermore, Empire's claims failed because Empire's as-
signor breached his obligations under any agreement which may 
have existed between the parties. Wilson's total failure to 
make payments to Weyerhaeuser excused Weyerhaeuser's perfor-
mance. This failure also entitled Weyerhaeuser to demand, as a 
condition of return of any refund to Empire, that Weyerhaeuser 
be reimbursed for the benefit received by Wilson. Empire failed 
to do so, and thus Weyerhaeuser had no obligation to return any 
funds. 
Empire failed to meet its burden of proof respecting the 
damages it sustained, and failed to bring indispensable parties 
before the court. Finally, the award of attorneys' fees for col-
lection as set forth in the judgment was in error and in clear 
contravention of the relief sought by the parties. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1989 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
EMPIRE LAND TITLE, INC., 
aka EMPIRE TITLE COMPANY, JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEYERHAEUSER MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Civil NO. 873000903CV 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 17th day of November, 1988, the Honorable E. Patrick 
McGuire presiding. Trie Plaintiff was represented by Mark F. 
Robinson. The Defendant was represented by Donald Winder. 
The Court having heard the testimony introduced on behalf 
of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That Judgment is granted to the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $5,473.04 together with interest at the rate of 
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ten percent (10%) per annum from September 13, 1982 to the 
date of Judgment and twelve (12%) percent per annum from the 
date of Judgment, until paid in full and for court costs in 
the amount of $48.75* 
It is further ordered that this Judgment shall be 
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys 
fees expended in collecting said Judgment by execution or 
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit* 
DATED this t 1989. 
BY<T£H£COURT 
E. PATRICK McGUIR 
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of the foregoing Judgment and Affidavit of Court Costs to 
Donald J. Winder, WINDER & HASLAM, P.C., 175 West 200 South, 
Suite 4004, P.O. Box 2668, Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668, 
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IN THE 7XB.TH CIRCUIT COURT FOR CTAE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
EMPIRE LAND TITLE, INC., 
aka EMPIRE TITLE COMPANY, FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEYERHAEUSER MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
Defendant. Civil No. 873C00303CV 
The above-en til lea matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 17th day of November, 1980, the Honorable E. Patrick 
McGuire presiding. The Plaintiff was represented by Mark F. 
Robinson. The Defendant was represented by Donald Winder. 
The Court having heard the testimony introduced on behalf of 
ths parties and being fully advised in the premises, now 
makes its Findings cf Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
fellow:':: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Utah, and doing business in 
Utah County, Utah. 
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2. Defendant is a mortgage company doing business in 
Utah County, Utah. 
3. The amount prayed for herein is less than 
$10,000.00. 
4. On August 26, 1932, pursuant to Plaintiff's 
request, Defendant .delivered a written beneficiary statement 
to Plaintiff setting forth the amount of money necessary for 
assumption of a mortgage loan owned and held by Weyerhaeuser 
Mortgage company. 
5. By its written commitment in the Beneficiary 
Statement, Defendant agreed with Plaintiff to allow 
Plaintiff's client to assume the mortgage referred to in the 
Beneficiary Statement by complying with the terms of that 
statement. 
6. Plaintiff fully complied with all the terms of the 
Beneficiary Statement by delivering to Defendant 
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage its check #2325 in the amount of 
$5,473.04 on September 13, 1982. 
7. Defendant negotiated Plaintiff's check and kept the 
funds. 
8. Defendant breached its agreement with Plaintiff by 
failing to effect the assumption intended by the Beneficiary 
Statement. 
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9. On or about April 12, 1984, Plaintiff discovered 
that Defendant had breached its agreement and in fact had, 
on or about March 26, 1982, foreclosed the mortgage 
intended to be assumed and had recorded a Trustee's Deed 
and taken title to the property by a Trustee's Deed recorded 
as Entry No. 8070, in Book 1973, at pages 75 through 77 of 
the records of Utah County, Utah. 
10. Despite demand, Defendant has failed and refused 
to return the funds paid by Empire to Defendant for 
assumption of the loan. 
11. Because of Defendant's failure and refusal to 
return the funds paid or the assumption to Empire, Empire 
has further been damaged in that it has been required to 
restore those funds with interest to its escrow client and 
has incurred attorney's fees and expenses in dealing with 
this matter. 
12. Since September 13, 1982, Defendant Weyerhaeuser 
has held, used and kept funds in the amount of $5,473.04 
belonging to the Plaintiff and to which it was not entitled. 
Defendant Weyerhaeuser has been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of Empire Title Company and Empire is entitled to 
recover its funds, with interest from the Defendant. 
3 
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13. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has proven the 
elements in its first claim for relief and in its second 
claim for relief. The Court makes no finding as to 
Plaintiff's third claim for relief. 
14. The Court finds that the defense has not proven 
the element of their Counterclaim and, therefore, the same 
is dismissed. 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant's third defense, 
Statute of limitation, does not apply and that there are 
writings exhibiting agreement between the parties (Exhibits 
1 and 2). Further, the court finds that the Plaintiff 
brought the Complaint in a timely manner after error was 
discovered. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
16. Judgment should be granted to the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $5,473.0 4 together with interest at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum from September 13, 1982 to the 
date of judgment and twelve percent (12%) per annum from the 
date of judgment until paid in full, and court costs in the 
amount of $48.75. 
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17. The terms of the Judgment should comport with the 
Findings of Fact entered herein. 
DATED this /%- day of fem&fy', 1989. 
BY T&E COURT: 
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postage prepaid, this u/ day of -January, 1989/7 
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